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Abstract
Both theoretical frameworks and empirical evidence show that asset-based, means-tested welfare
programs have negative effects on savings behaviors of welfare recipients. In this study, we
examine how welfare recipiency is associated with savings outcomes in Individual Development
Accounts. The results suggest that when other factors are controlled, receipt of welfare either
before or at enrollment of IDAs is not correlated with savings outcomes. Policy implications
under current welfare reform are discussed.
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Background
Compared with nonpoor households, many poor households accumulate little wealth over their
lifetime. For example, in 1994, over 90% of welfare recipients have less than $500 of
accumulated financial liquid assets (Hurst & Ziliak, 2001). The poor may have low wealth
because they have low abilities to accumulate assets. For example, the poor face a lifetime of
lower incomes and other resources. The low accumulation of assets of the poor might also be due
in part to their responses to disincentives to accumulate assets created by means-tested transfer
programs, such as AFDC/TANF, SSI, Medicaid and Food Stamps. In order to be eligible for
benefits, a household’s income and assets holdings must be sufficiently low. And even if it is
eligible, benefits are reduced as recipients’ private resources increase. A variety of theoretical
frameworks predict that asset limits negatively influence savings.
Theory
Theory suggests both direct and indirect effects of asset-based, means-tested welfare programs
on the savings behaviors of welfare recipients. The major direct effect is that, in order to receive
many forms of government assistance, households may not accumulate assets above the federal
or state mandated limit (Hubbard, Skinner, & Zeldes, 1994; 1995). Thus, assets-based means
testing is a strong financial disincentive to save. The “limited-savings-on-welfare” rule poses a
threat to the long-run wealth accumulation of welfare-dependent individuals and their
communities (Sherraden, 1991).
Using a simulation model parameterized to the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID),
Hubbard, Skinner, & Zeldes (1994; 1995) suggest that welfare programs also have two indirect
negative effects on savings. First, the provision of public assistance decreases precautionary
saving because it reduces the uncertainty facing households in the bad states. This effect is more
relevant to low-income people because welfare payments are high relative to their resources.
Second, the restriction on asset holdings of welfare programs implies an implicit tax of 100
percent on wealth in the event that an earnings downturn or large medical expense causes the
household to seek welfare support. This effect is much stronger for the group with lower lifetime
income, in part because the uninsured risks of medical spending are a larger fraction of their
normal consumption levels. In sum, means-tested welfare programs have the greatest negative
effects on saving for low-income groups because the guaranteed consumption floor represents a
larger fraction of their lifetime income. The threat of the loss of this income due to breaking asset
limits discourages saving.
While different theoretical perspectives are consistent regarding negative effects of asset tests on
savings, the effects of increasing asset limits are more ambiguous. Sherraden (1991) and Beverly
& Sherraden (1999) assume that individuals manifest a fair amount of rationality and predict that
individuals will respond positively if the constraints of blocking assets accumulation are
eliminated and attractive saving incentives exist. Therefore, the poor will save more if assets
limits that determine welfare program eligibility are relaxed or eliminated. Others argue that the
effect of increasing the asset limit on savings depends on whether or not and how the poor
responds to the change (Hubbard et al., 1995; Powers, 1998). For example, the response to the
elimination of asset limits of the poor could be weak because they have very low permanent
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incomes. When people have fewer resources to save, they must make a greater effort if they want
to save more. Also, although the households with low permanent incomes may respond to the
asset test, those households with assets sufficiently above the original assets limits but not much
above the new limits might reduce wealth in order to qualify. Under these circumstances, raising
limits could reduce wealth accumulation and also increase welfare caseloads.
Evidence
Several studies have documented the negative effect of assets limits on a variety of governmentpublic assistance and social-insurance programs on wealth accumulation among low-income
households (Carney & Gale, 1999; Engen & Gruber, 1995; Feldstein, 1992; Gruber & Yelowitz,
1997; Hubbard et al., 1994; 1995; Hurst and Ziliak, 2001; Neumark & Powers, 1998; Powers,
1998; Silverman, 1997; Ziliak, 1999). Relevant to the discussion of this study, for example,
Silverman (1997) found that 49 percent of public assistance recipients indicated that they would
save more if the government did not cut their benefits because of their savings. Carney and Gale
(1999) found that receipt of public assistance was negatively related to wealth accumulation after
controlling for a series of other variables including income and educational status. Some of these
studies also examine how relaxing asset limits is related to the savings of both current and
potential welfare recipients. For example, Powers (1998) found that a dollar increase in the
AFDC asset limit was associated with about 25 cents additional savings of potential AFDC
recipients (female-headed households). Using state-level variations in AFDC, Food Stamps, SSI,
and Unemployment Insurance, Ziliak (1999) suggests that means-tested welfare programs as a
saving disincentive contributes 25 percent (at most) of the rich-poor wealth gap, and that these
programs discourage accumulation of liquid assets but not net wealth. The recent study by Hurst
and Ziliak (2001) found that a $170 increase in liquid assets savings per $1,000 increase in the
assets limits for households at high risk of entering welfare. They also found evidence that the
modest-risk households of entering welfare dissaved in response to higher asset limits. This
finding is consistent with the discussion by Hubbard et al. (1995) of possible negative effects of
raising asset limits on the savings of the “near-poor”. To our knowledge, Hurst and Ziliak (2001)
and Powers (1998) are the only two formal empirical tests of how assets limits affect the savings
of low-income households.
In this paper, we examine savings behaviors of welfare recipients in a matched savings program
for the poor—American Dream Demonstration (ADD), which is a national demonstration of
Individual Development Accounts for low-wealth households. Individual Development Accounts
(IDAs) are special savings accounts that are designed to help people build assets for household
development and long-term economic security (Sherraden, 1988; 1991). Account holders receive
matching funds as they save for purposes such as buying a first home, job training, going to a
college, or starting a small business. Because savings in ADD do not count toward asset limits
for welfare program eligibility, and the savings are matched, it is expected that ADD will
increase savings of welfare recipients. This study is the first quantitative assessment of the
savings patterns of welfare-recipients in a structured savings program, and how their savings
patterns are different from non- and former welfare recipients.
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Motivation

Studies that examine the relationship between welfare recipiency and savings outcomes have
important policy implications under current welfare reform policy. Until recently the welfare
program was cash-based, and recipients could not exceed assets limits while on public
assistance. For example, by 1983, all but a couple of states imposed a $1,000 limit on most nonhome, non-vehicle property, and a $1,500 vehicle equity exclusion (Powers, 1998). The
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) of 1996
represents a fundamental change in the delivery of cash welfare to program participants.
Following enactment of PRWORA, states replaced Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC) with a work-based program Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF). Major
changes under PRWORA included the end of an entitlement to policy, time limits, and a greater
control of program rules by states. Individual Development Accounts (IDAs), a matched savings
program for the poor, were included as a state option in the PRWORA, allowing states to
establish IDA programs using TANF funds and to exclude counting IDAs as assets for the
purpose of qualifying for benefits.
In response to PRWORA, many states are attempting to stimulate savings of the poor by
loosening limits on liquid-asset and vehicle wealth holdings and adopting IDAs. By federal fiscal
year 1998, 37 states had increased the liquid-asset limit above $1,000 and 47 states had increased
the vehicle exemption limit above $1,500 (Hurst & Ziliak, 2001). Also, at least 29 states have
passed IDAs or related legislation allowing TANF recipients and/or low-income residents in
their states to participate savings (Center for Social Development, 2000). Therefore, it is
important to know how welfare recipients save in IDAs.
Data and Methods
Subjects
The data for this study came from the 14 IDA programs across the United States that are part of
the American Dream Demonstration (ADD). The project is funded by a consortium of
foundations and is the first systematic test of IDAs. The primary purpose of ADD is to find out
whether IDAs are successful, in what ways, and for whom. In terms of scope and resources,
ADD may be the largest policy demonstration in the country at the present time. ADD is
scheduled to run for four years (1997-2001), with research extending several additional years.
Enrollment began in July 1997, and as of June 30, 2000, ADD had 2,378 participants.
“Participants” in this analysis include all enrollees, including those who have dropped out of the
program without a matched withdrawal. Program staff collect demographic and savings
information for the evaluation of ADD with the Management Information System for Individual
Development Accounts (Johnson, Hinterlong, & Sherraden, 2001). Savings data come from
monthly passbook savings account records from depository institutions. Welfare status of
participants is reported at their enrollment in the IDA program.
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Measurements
Savings and asset accumulation in IDAs are built up from several elements that affect savings
and assets accumulation. These elements include deposits, withdrawals (matched or unmatched),
interests, fees, match rates and incomes (Schreiner et al., 2001). No single number could capture
every element. Therefore, we included five dependent variables which measure the combined
effects of different elements on savings outcomes. These measures include Average Monthly Net
Deposit (AMND), the savings rate, deposit frequency, net deposits as a percentage of the prorated match cap, and the presence of unmatched withdrawals. AMND is defined as deposits plus
interests minus unmatched withdrawals, divided by the number of months of participation.
AMND measures net deposits but also controls for the length of time that a participant has saved.
The second measure, the savings rate, is defined as the ratio of AMND to gross monthly
household income. It measures the rate at which inflows of resources are converted into IDA
deposits. This measure is important because it shows how much participants save relative to their
current income. Deposit frequency, on the other hand, shows how steadily a participant saves
through time, and it is defined as the number of months with a deposit (excluding interest)
divided by the number of months of participation. The fourth measure, net deposit as a
percentage of the pro-rated match cap, is defined as the ratio of the AMND to monthly savings
target. It indicates the closeness of actual saving behavior to that which would take full
advantage of match incentives. The last measurement, the presence of unmatched withdrawals, is
a dichotomous measure that indicates if a participant made unmatched withdrawals or not.
Because IDAs are matched savings program designed for certain purposes including
homeownership, education, training and business capitalization, the presence of unmatched
withdrawals indicates that participants, by circumstances or preferences, succumb to shorter-term
consumption needs.
Mean values of these dependent variables are presented in Table 1 for participants with different
welfare status and for all ADD participants. As indicated in Table 1, on average ADD
participants had $25.42 AMND, and this represented 2.2 percent of their average monthly
income. They saved on average 67 percent of their savings target and the mean value of deposit
frequency was 58 percent (about 7 months out of 12). The average probability of dropping out
was 16 percent, and the average probability of unmatched withdrawals was 37 percent. When
other factors are not controlled, compared with participants who never received welfare,
participants who received welfare before or at enrollment had lower values of AMND, savings
rate, deposit frequency and net deposit as a percentage of the pro-matched savings cap.
Participants who never received welfare also had higher probability of dropping out of the
program than those who received welfare before enrollment, and higher probability to make
unmatched withdrawals compared with the participants who received welfare before or at
enrollment (Table 1).
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Table 1: Mean Values of Savings Outcomes by Welfare Status of Participants
Savings outcomes
AMND ($)
Savings rate (%)
Deposit frequency
(%)
Net deposit as a
percentage of the promatched savings cap
(%)
Probability of exits
(%)
Probability of
unmatched
withdrawals (%)

TANF or
AFDC never
26.9
2.6
58

TANF or
TANF
AFDC formerly currently
22.9
16.1
2.2
2.1
57
48

All ADD
25.4
2.2
58

71

61

53

67

17

14

24

16

38

35

36

37

The independent variables are welfare recipiency status of participants: those who never received
AFDC/TANF, those who formerly received AFDC/TANF (before the enrollment of ADD), and
those currently receives TANF (at enrollment of ADD). In regression analyses, “never received
TANF/AFDC” serves as a reference group. Thirty-seven percent of participants received
AFDC/TANF before enrollment, and 10 percent received TANF at enrollment. Altogether, 38
percent of participants (with non-missing data) had received either AFDC or TANF at some
point. In other words, 62 percent of participants had never received welfare. (Many, but not all
IDA programs in ADD have targeted the “working poor”.)
Control variables include a variety of program and participants characteristics. This paper
includes a large number of controls: 11 institutional characteristics and 31 participant
characteristics. Institutional characteristics include program and administrative factors that may
affect savings such as match rate, match cap, financial education and program inputs. A variety
of participant factors were also controlled including participants’ demographic and enrollment
characteristics. These variables are assumed to be linked with savings outcomes or unobserved
factors (Schreiner et al., 2001).
Analyses
In order to control for the bias of self-selection, a Heckman two-step was conducted (Greene,
1993; Heckman, 1979; Schreiner et al., 2001). The first step is a probit regression on dropout
status for all participants. The second step is least-square regressions on savings outcomes for
those participants with non-dropouts, controlling for a wide range of program and participants
characteristics that might affect savings outcomes. Dropouts are defined as participants who
leave a program without having taken a matched withdrawal. For dropouts, net deposits are zero
by definition. In ADD, as of June 30, 2000, 16 percent of enrollees had dropped out. Because the
presence of unmatched withdrawals is a dichotomous variable, a probit regression is run on this
variable. For probit models, because the estimates do not have a direct interpretation, they are
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converted to units of percentage points of change in the predicted risk of non-dropouts given a
unit change of independent variable (Schreiner et al., 2001). For the OLS regression models, the
estimates are presented.
Results1
Table 2 presents the results of the first step of Heckman two-step regression, which predicts the
probability of dropping out from the IDA program. Results indicate that, compared to those who
never received welfare, participants who received TANF at enrollment were 0.76 percentage
points more likely to drop out, and those who received AFDC/TANF before enrollment were .09
percentage points less likely to drop out. But the relationships were not statistically significant.
In other words, participants in ADD who received TANF were no more likely to drop out than
others.
Table 2: Welfare Status of Participants and Dropouts: Probit Regression
Mean
TANF or AFDC never
TANF or AFDC formerly
TANF currently

.62
.38
.10

Change in
% points

p-value

.09
-.76

.86
.27

Table 3 presents the second step of the Heckman two-step regression on savings outcomes which
shows the relationship between welfare status and savings outcomes after controlling for other
factors. The results indicate that receipt of AFDC/TANF, whether before or at enrollment, was
not significantly related to AMND, savings rate, deposit frequency or net deposit relative to the
savings target. In other words, with other observed factors in the model constant, receipt of
welfare is uncorrelated with unobserved factors that reduce saving. Table 3 also shows that the
receipt of welfare was not significantly associated with the probability of unmatched
withdrawals.

1

Due to the large number of control variables, we did not present the results of their relationships with savings
outcomes in regression analyses. The full results are available upon request.
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Table 3: Welfare Status of Participants and Savings Outcomes: OLS Regressions and
Probit Regression
Dependent variables
AMND
(TANF or AFDC never)
TANF or AFDC formerly
TANF currently
Savings rate
(TANF or AFDC never)
TANF or AFDC formerly
TANF currently
Deposit frequency
(TANF or AFDC never)
TANF or AFDC formerly
TANF currently
Net deposit as a percentage
of pro-rated match cap
(TANF or AFDC never)
TANF or AFDC formerly
TANF currently
Unmatched withdrawals
(TANF or AFDC never)
TANF or AFDC formerly
TANF currently

Coefficients/
change in % points*

p-value

-1.6
0.2

.20
.93

-.22
-.01

.36
.88

-.005
-.03

.70
.22

-.05
-.02

.14
.75

.05
-.89

.92
.22

* Units of percentage points of changes are reported for the dependent variable “unmatched
withdrawals” (probit regression). For all other dependent variables (OLS regressions),
coefficients are presented.
How can we explain this? Because savings in ADD do not count toward the asset limits to
receive public assistance, and ADD provides other savings incentives such as matches, financial
education and monthly savings goals, ADD is assumed to offer savings stimulus for participants.
These results suggest that incentives such as savings target and match rates may have greater
effects on savings for the very poor (Schreiner et al., 2001). At a minimum, it is safe to conclude
that some welfare recipients have the willingness to save if they are provided access and
incentives to accumulate assets. However, through the analysis of these data, we cannot fully
reveal exactly what kind of incentives caused the increase of their savings or sort out effects of
different factors.
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Conclusions
Evidence shows that welfare recipients have lower wealth accumulation than non-welfare
recipients, and this is partly because asset limits discourage savings. The results of this study
indicate that, after controlling for other factors, welfare receipt before or at enrollment in IDAs
did not significantly affect a variety of their savings outcomes. These results suggest that at least
some welfare recipients have the ability and willingness to save.
We interpret the results with caution because several limitations of this study should be noted.
First, participants in ADD are both self-selected (they chose to participate based on expected net
benefits) and program-selected (most programs targeted the “working poor”). Therefore, ADD
participants, in some aspects, are different from the general low-income population. Second,
savings in IDAs may not necessarily represent a net increase of wealth. They could simply be
transferring savings from other assets towards IDAs. In other words, asset shifts are possible for
ADD participants (Schreiner et al., 2001). Third, using ADD data, we do not know yet how the
welfare recipients can save through IDAs because we cannot compare savings behaviors of
welfare recipients with or without IDAs.
In spite of these limitations, the findings of this study suggest that the response of welfare
recipients to savings incentives is not different from that of people who are not on welfare, after
controlling for income, assets, debts and a wide range of other characteristics. Welfare
recipiency itself, in the absence of asset limits, appears not to be linked with saving performance.
IDAs may be a potential way to help welfare recipients to accumulate assets and provide them
with opportunities to build assets and escape poverty over the long-term. Thus, it may be
desirable for public policy to encourage and support IDAs or other saving strategies for lowincome families.
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